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Gift of the 
£ Labadan Family of the Philippines i)' 

in honor of 
|^ Mario M. Labadan, Ph.D. '69 >; 
and 
Mario C. Labadan, Jr. MS '96 P 



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CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 




188 



A STRAIGHTFORWARD TALE. 



BY 



CLAY MacCAULEY. 



Reprinted from the 

Boston "Evening Transcript, " July 5, 1899. 



PUBLISHED BT THE 

ANTI-IMPERIALIST' LEAGUE- 
1899 



ASIA 

US 




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Ml»3 




fs«H 



A STRAIGHTFORWARD TALE. 



By Clay MacCauley. 



" Mr. MacCauley is well known hereabouts and what- 
ever he says commands the confidence that attaches to 
high character and sincere motives. . . . The facts 
which he presents regarding the situation in January 
Jast establish the contention . . . that the responsi- 
bility for the war rests on the Administration, and not 
on the opponents of the Paris treaty. It was the 
Administration which ungratefully cast off the allies it 
had courted, by whose aid it had captured Manila and 
its Spanish garrison. The United States might have 
continued the master of the Philippines, the respected 
and trusted protector of their people, stronger, we be- 
lieve, in that quarter of the world than it can ever make 
itself by alienating the sympathy of those teeming pop- 
ulations, without provoking this dreadful war and its 
century-long train of rankling disappointment and hate." 
— Boston " Herald " (formerly Administration and Impe- 
rialist newspaper), July 7, 1899. 

Tokyo, Japan, June 3. 

Several letters concerning what has appeared over my 
name in the "Transcript's" columns about the relations 
of the Government of the United States with the Philip- 
pines have recently reached me. The political future of 
these islands has already been determined, probably 
beyond changing, and the end of the present conflict may 
have come before what I now write shall get to America. 
Yet I wish to answer these letters publicly. I may in 
this way clear up much that is obscure in the minds not 
only of some of my correspondents, but in the thoughts 
of many others of the " Transcript's " readers. Besides-, 
it is desirable for the purpose of reference hereafter, I 
think, that there should be upon record a plain recital of 



the experiences that induced me to speak as I did. The 
importance of the matter will excuse exceptional per- 
sonal reference. 

I am no " politician ; " my work lies outside of " poli- 
tics." Yet I am profoundly concerned over anything 
that may seriously affect the welfare of the United 
States. So far as I am at all a political partisan, I am a 
Republican, and have been a Republican since the begin- 
nings of the party. I served as a soldier in the Civil 
War, and, for a time, after the battle of Cha'ncellorsville, 
was confined in Libby Prison. During the late war with 
Spain I thoroughly sympathized with the humanitarian 
aim that seemed to guide it, and I welcomed the pros- 
pect of our gaining for their protection and guidance the 
peoples of the West Indies and the Philippines, assum- 
ing all along that these peoples desired our help. 

My visit to Manila in January last was not made, as 
it has, been said, " for the purpose of investigating the 
situation." It was undertaken because I was not well 
at the time, and believed that the voyage to the Philip- 
pines would be diverbing and helpful. That the trip 
was the occasion of the opposition I have shown in the 
" Transcript " and elsewhere to the " annexation policy " 
of our country's Administration was not of my wishing'; 
indeed, hardly anything has ever caused me more regret 
than the necessity I came under at the time to antago- 
nize the course of action disclosed in the Philippines, 
as authorized and commanded by President McKinley 
and his advisers. For a long time I could not believe 
that the disastrous drift of events there was going on 
known to the Washington authorities. I was inclined 
to lay the responsibility for the increasing .perils upon 
the military commander directly in charge. I still think 
that General Otis, conscientious, faithful administrator 
and brave soldier that he is, was not as tactful as one 
should have been in his dealings with Aguinaldo and his 
followers. A commander temperamentally more like the 
President himself would probably have avoided much 
that hastened the grave alienations between Filipinos 
and Americans. Yet now it seems clear to me that 
General Otis did his work, in the main, in literal obedi- 
ence to his superiors in America ; that there it was 
assumed that the whole right and duty concerning the 
future disposition and control of the Philippine Islands 
lay in the wishes and will of the United States ; that 
what the Filipinos themselves might wish need not be 



taken into the account in formulating plans for their 
government. I think now that information of the in- 
creasing dangers that I found almost at their full when 
I arrived in Manila had been steadily communicated to 
the authorities at Washington, but that the authorities 
there upon principle regarded them as unworthy their 
attention, except as signs of a rebellion that should be 
forcibly dealt with should they lead to any resistance. 

Apparently, from the downfall of Manila, the principle 
that guided 'the American Administration was that the 
only party to treat with in the settlement of the Philip- 
pine problem was Spain; that the Filipinos should be 
wholly passive to American dictation or suffer such con- 
sequences as one meted out to rebels. However, this 
question may meet us again. I shall for the present 
speak of the experiences I. had at Manila that were de- 
cisive for me. 

One of the first things that led me into serious conver- 
sation about the situation was a remark at dinner the day 
of my arrival by a friend resident in Manila. "You 
should have been here a few days ago and seen the sight. 
It took nine regiments to post one sentry." In the talk 
that followed I learned that at last an acute and danger- 
ous crisis had been reached in the relations of the Fili- 
pinos and our forces. It appeared that while, up to the 
capture .of Manila, the Filipino insurgents against Spain 
had been practically allies of the Americans, — in large 
part armed by us, associated with us in the siege of the 
Spanish army, and helpful to us in bringing about the 
surrender of Manila, — very soon after the surrender they 
were looked upon as an "obstacle" to our movements. 
I was told a long story of the repeated demands our 
officers had made upon the Filipinos, who had been occu- 
pying lines of attack upon the Spaniards drawn by them 
in cooperation with our forces, to "fall back," and to 
make place for our soldiers. They were, at first com- 
pliant, giving up their trenches and breastworks. During 
the summer and autumn the Filipinos yielded position 
after position in front of Manila to our regiments. Grad- 
ually a line of American soldiers was drawn around the 
captured (fity. The Filipinos Were left outside our mili- 
tary circuit, an army once our " allies," but at last become 
only an embarrassing crowd, supplanted, repulsed, and, 
as soldiers, ignored. This changed relation of the two 
forces was not the result, so I was told, of the wishes of 
our own soldiers. 



The American officers had but obeyed commands sent 
to them from Washington. One of my friends declared : 
" These people seem to have no existence of their own so 
far as Washington is concerned. No one there seems to 
care a bit for what they think or wish." Was it any 
wonder, then, that as the Filipinos were again and again 
ordered to " fall back ; " as they saw the American en- 
closure of Manila completed ; as they saw the American 
fleet and army increase week after week ; and as they 
were made to understand more fully their exclusion from 
social and official intercourse with their former friends, 
they began 'to look upon the doings oj: the Americans as 
aggressive against themselves and as threatening an as- 
sumption of political sovereignty over them ? Naturally 
their protests against the repeated demands made upon 
them to " fall back " began to arouse them to antagonism. 
They insisted upon their rights as our allies and as the 
people of the Philippines. They lost their idealization 
of their American "emancipators" with great unwilling- 
ness, but in the end they accepted the fact that they were 
dealing with would-be masters. They refused to with- 
draw farther. At a point near Paco, I think it was, they 
made their 'first attempt at resistance to our forces. They 
advanced somewhat their own lines. It was of this 
episode that my friend had spoken. Our demand, had 
been insisted upon with a display of force. We had had 
our way. But we had also set gradually kindling fires of 
hate and revenge into full flame. ; The posting of that 
sentry cost us far more than it had gained. Thus it 
came about that the beginning of my visit to Manila was 
more like entrance into a besieged city than into a city 
that our armies had set free. But open hostilities were 
not yet. Persons without weapons had unchallenged 
ingress and egress through the two opposed lines. 

it was during the time of this critical state of affairs 
that General Otis issued; in the President's name, the 
fateful proclamation of January 4, isstied from the 
" Office of the Military Governor of the Philippine 
Islands." The day after I arrived in Manila the procla- 
mation appeared. Immediately afterwards came Agui- 
naldo's counter-proclamation, protesting' in "most solemn 
and earnest terms against "this act, so little expected, of 
the sovereignty of America in these islands." So far as 
I heard persons discuss the matter, — and I he#rd many, 
— the proclamation of the President was regarded as 
neither happily put nor well-timed. But it at least made 



the fact clear to every one that the American Govern- 
ment had determined to " administer affairs in the Phil- 
ippine Islands," and that "the mission of the United 
States " was proclaimed as " one of beneficent assimila- 
tion." The further fact was made clear, also, that at 
last a "rupture of amicable relations between the Filipi- 
nos and the army of the United States" had really 
occurred, and that the Filipinos felt confident that they 
had " done everything possible to avoid a rupture, even 
to the extent of sacrificing uselessly many clear rights." 
The bitterness of the disappointment of these people 
was expressed in Aguinaldo's words : " I was convinced 
that the American forces must sympathize with the 
revolution which they had assisted to foment, and which 
saved them much bloodshed and hard work, and above 
all I had absolute confidence in the history and traditions 
of a nation which struggled for its independence, and for 
the abolition of slavery, and held itself up as the 
champion liberator of oppressed peoples under the safe- 
guard of the good faith of a free people." These strong 
words, I know, have been ridiculed, but when I first read 
them under impressions made upon me by the judgment 
of men who believed Aguinaldo at least in earnest and 
sincere, I felt a profound pity for their writer and his 
people, and I longed to plead for him and his cause with 
the legislators at home who then held the liberties of 
the Filipinos under their unspoken wills. 

Within two days after the President's proclamation 
and Aguinaldo's answers, I had the honor of a conversa- 
tion with Gen. E. S. Otis, the military governor at Ma- 
nila. I had become so much disturbed over the coming 
of the conflict which I then saw inevitable, unless some 
immediate preventive measure were devised, that possi- 
bly I attempted overmuch. However, General Otis re- 
ceived me courteously: I violate no confidence -in 
repeating some of his words. He " hoped " that the 
crisis would " pass without trouble." I told him of my 
intention to write to some acquaintances, members of the 
United States Senate. I asked him whether there was 
anything he was willing to say that would aid me in my 
appeal. In answer, among other things, General Otis 
expressed regret that there was not a better knowledge 
of the situation among the Washington legislators than 
there seemed to be. And he impressed me deeply by his 
declaration : " I was ordered to this post from San Fran- 
cisco. I did not believe in the annexation of these 



1 

islands when I came here, nor do I believe in their an- 
nexation now." General Otis has done his duty without 
wavering, all through the terrible months since the 
struggle began, yet I often now think of our Philippines 
commander — the careworn, anxious man I saw in Janu- 
ary last — as doing his present duty without the inspira- 
tion that should make his burden light. Of course I 
speak thinking only of what General Otis believed at the 
time we had our talk. 

I also had the privilege of conversation with Admiral 
Dewey. I violate no confidence in repeating some things 
he also said to me. I tell of these things that friends 
and the public generally may. understand why I have 
been pleading so earnestly for the Filipinos and for the 
preservation of what I believe to be that which most 
honors our country among the world's nations. In talk- 
ing with Admiral Dewey I went even so far as to say that 
I believed the people of the United States would support 
him were he to take some immediate initiative to pre- 
vent the threatening struggle. I shall not repeat his 
answer at length. But he spoke much of his concern 
over the turn affairs had taken, and added that he " was 
powerless to act." Yet at one point in his remarks he 
declared: "-Rather than make a war of conquest of this 
people, I would Up anchor and sail out of the harbor." 
lie, like General Otis, has done his duty since then in 
giving his ships to aid the army in an attempt at restoring 
order to the islands, but I am sure that • the duty has 
been sadly done, and that it was done only because it was 
duty. 

Not only did I find the eommanders of our army and 
navy opposed to the annexation of the Philippine Islands, 
but more outspoken in opposition were most of the offi- 
cers high* in command, both on the shore and in the- 
fleet, — I mean those I had the pleasure of meeting. It 
is not necessary to tell of this fact at length. Moreover, 
our consul at Manila said decidedly that Aguinaldo and 
his immediate associates were not appreciated at home 
for their real worth. He, like our army and navy chiefs, 
did not believe in a conquest of. the Filipinos ; and he 
deprecated the unfortunate series of events that had led 
up to the hostile alienation that daily threatened an out- 
break into war. 

When I left Manila immediate danger had apparently 
been done away with bythe appointment of commissions 
from both the opposed camps for the purpose of deliber- 



s 



ation. For clays war had seemed to be only a question 
of each hour. But by means of the commissions time at 
least had been gained aiid a modus vivendi was possible. 
Each commander of the hostile forces had forbidden any 
aggressive act on the part of his soldiers. During the 
voyage to Hong Kong I still believed that, did the Presi- 
dent only know the situation as it was, he could and 
would remove the whole trouble by a proclamation as- 
suring the Filipinos of autonomy under an American pro- 
tectorate. When I reached Hong Kong, January 15, the 
outlook at Manila was promising for peace, for a while 
at least. Since time had been gained I tried to reach 
the people and our President by the cable service of the 
New York "Herald," closing the despatch with the 
words, " Immediate action is imperative." I am not in- 
clined to be an alarmist, but knowing what I did know, 
almost hopeless though the appeal seemed, I could not 
do other than make it. I could only do my part as every 
American citizen should, since all of us, in every station, 
large or small, share in our country's honor or disgrace. 
Assuming as a privilege that an American citizen may 
express opinion freely on all matters affecting his 
country's welfare, and urged by the fearful perils con- 
fronting our nation at Manila, I wrote to President Mc- 
Kinley immediately upon my making Hong Kong. I 
had met him in Washington and I could refer him to 
well-known public men with whom I am acquainted. I 
shall here make parts of this letter public. " One of the 
chief misfortunes attending our occupation of Manila," I 
wrote, "has been the inability of our officials at home 
and there to announce to .the Filipinos, definitely, as a 
thing established, an administrative policy. The Fili- 
pinos do not understand that the United States by act 
of Congress has not yet assumed the sovereignty of the 
islands. Moreover, most of their leaders are convinced 
that our assumption of this sovereignty naturally means 
assumption of it for our own use, and not as a trust to 
be held by the United States for them. In consequence 
. . . the alienation now so acute began, and as a 
result . . . our officers were obliged to decline offi- 
cial intercourse with the Filipinos. Soon social inter- 
course with them lessened, and finally it ceased. As a 
further result of this absence of a definite policy, the 
proclamation of January 4 in your name was misinter- 
pretated by Aguinaldo, and thus widened instead of nar- 
rowing the chasm between our people and the Filipinos. 



Aguinaldo answered General Otis as though it had been 
decreed by you that the Philippines had become subject 
to the United States, their people denied henceforth any 
form of autonomy, taken under control wholly without 
their consent and wholly without our having had any 
conference with them to that end. . . . But, what- 
ever the cause, it is the lamentable fact that the Fili- 
pinos and the Americans are no longer friends. And 
they might have been good friends could our benevolent 
policy have been authoritatively announced months ago, 
and a sympathetic attitude towards them taken from 
the first by those in charge of the military administra- 
tion of Manila." 

I spoke then to the President of how formidable the 
Filipinos had become as armed enemies during the course 
of their alienation from us ; in having " at first supplied 
them with arms as though they were our allies." I then 
described the dangers in the then present situation, and 
some scenes I had witnessed when I was within the in- 
surgent lines and during the critical, excited clays just 
before I had left Manila, asserting that only some " trifle 
would precipitate irremediable disaster." 

In my appeal for some action that would avoid this 
calamity I wrote : " If it is among the possibilities Con- 
gress should so act. that you can at once definitely an- 
nounce the will of the American people concerning these 
islands. But, if it is the will of our people to assume 
actual sovereignty of the Philippines as an integral part 
of our body politic, I am sure that, unless some device 
is adopted by which the Philippine insurgents voluntar- 
ily accept the annexation of their country, we shall have 
to enter upon a war before which the calamities of our 
Seminole War in the Florida swamps would be insignifi- 
cant. Annexation might be accomplished peaceably were 
we to do what we can to undo the effects of our attitude 
hitherto, that is, were we to assume sympathetic relations : 
to recognize Aguinaldo and his army as our allies during 
the past six months ; to assure him a high command in 
the military or civil department of our Philippines' 
administration ; to pay to the. soldiers who served with 
him during the war ; . ■ . . to enlist a large body of 
these soldiers ; ... to conduct as far as possible the 
civil government ... by means of native employees. 
The quicker way to peace and good feeling, however, is 
beyond question a decision by the American Congress 
that the Philippine people shall be autonomous under the 
protection of the United States. 



10 

" I assume much in making this expression of opinion,, 
but I have studied this question with anxious interest. 
Besides, residence for some years in this part of the 
world has given me some insight into the character and 
needs of the peoples native here. I do not think the 
sudden incorporation of an Oriental, especially this 
Malay people into our body politic would help us. Our 
history does not justify us in making any race our sub- 
jects. . . . Moreover, the upper classes of the Philippines 
are intelligent and cultivated enough to make national 
self-government possible, or to endanger a government 
imposed upon them from another land. With a protec- 
torate we can influence and help the Filipinos much. A 
possession on this seashore would give us a commanding 
interest in their foreign relations, and also in the manage- 
ment of our part of Asiatic commerce. In time closer 
relations might come naturally between our country and 
these islands. Then the result would satisfy and benefit 
us all." 

I said much more in this letter to the President. I do 
not know that it ever reached him. Its receipt was, 
however, acknowledged by his secretary. But I was so 
much aroused by the crisis at Manila that I was com- 
pelled to make at least the effort to secure the President's 
attention. 

As the world now knows, the threatened danger was 
not escaped. Within three weeks after the time of which 
I speak, the present terrible war began. As soon as I 
reached Japan I sent my first letter to the " Transcript," 
summarizing reasons why the Philippines should not be 
annexed to the United States and telling of my forebod- 
ings should there be no change in our evident policy 
towards them. At the outbreak of the hostilities I 
denounced the treatment of the Filipinos that had led 
up to the outbreak and told of where I thought the 
responsibility for our humiliation lay. To-day's letter 
will make clear why I took the positions shown in those 
letters. From what I have said here all will now clearly 
understand that my words were not written without 
urgent reason ; that so far as events have happened I 
did not warn without ample 1 cause; and that I have 
nowhere predicted imaginary evils. The Filipinos are 
now called '' rebels " and are branded as felons. But 
they were never, in fact, either our fellow-citizens or our 
subjects. How, then, could they enter, in any true sense, 
into " rebellion " against the United States ? I say this 



11 

not unmindful of the transfer of sovereignty over them 
made in the " Treaty of Paris " by Spain to our country. 
That was really an empty transfer so far as this people 
were involved. They had long refused to acknowledge 
Spain as their sovereign, and we had # helped them make 
this revolt a success. They were their own masters in 
every real sense of the word when Manila fell, whatever 
the technicalities of international law may be. Further, 
men, really citizens of the United States, who now 
oppose this war for the conquest of the Philippines, are 
by many, so I see, denounced as " traitors " to the coun- 
try. I return the charge, for I hold that " treason " for 
an American lies much nearer those who would bring 
about the subjugation of a people struggling for civil 
liberty than it- does near those who pity them and who 
lament over the wrongs that arrayed them against our 
country. Of course I would give no aid or comfort- to 
any one in arms against the -United States, but I cannot 
do other now than oppose the misguided faction of my 
own people, that would complete the great wrong in 
progress in the Philippines. I must plead with my fel- 
low-citizens to save our land from the dishonor that now 
threatens, if it does not already possess it. 

What the larger obligations of the present Administra- 
tion at Washington may be I do not know. These are 
" world-politics " now. According to international law 
the legalized parties to the political transfer of the Phil- 
ippines were the United States, the conquerors of Spain, 
and Spain, the defeated state. The Pilipinos, techni- 
cally the subjects of Spain, possibly had no technical will 
that the governments negotiating about them were 
bound to respect. They were and had be'en for years in 
rebellion against Spain. We helped them, in their rebel- 
lion. We accepted their help in our war upon Spain. 
Why our sudden cnange towards them ? Was there any 
influence, not yet publicly acknowledged, that at the 
downfall of Manila compelled the Administration of the 
United States to push forward, so unreasoningly and re- 
lentlessly, its determination to ignore the Eilipinos, their 
"allies," and to make of the Philippines an American 
" colony " or " possession," whether the Philippines' peo- 
ple so wished or not ? Possibly, though this is the 
merest speculation, the American Administration is under 
some obligation, connected with certain rapidly matur- 
ing crises in "world-politics," and must do this act, let 
the peoples of the Philippines think what they will and 



12 

try to save themselves as they may. It is exceedingly 
difficult to guess well at any satisfactory explanation 
of this singular overthrow of the fundamental prin- 
ciples upon which the American democracy is based, but 
there may be the possibility, that our seizure of this 
Asiatic archipelago is in part fulfilment of some pledge 
our authorities have made, that the solution of the bar 
Eastern question, when it comes, shall have the United 
States as a factor in its completion. 

Were this the true explanation, some good men might 
persuade themselves to endure the present evils for the 
sake of some overwhelming gain. Even this explanation, 
however, would not remove the record of mistakes, mis- 
understanding, and injustice with which the course of 
e vents Jn the Philippines was marked during the diplo- 
matic developments last year in the "world-politics" 
that made the arbitrary and heedless assumption of 
political sovereignty by the United States a necessity. 
If there is any truth in this speculation it will in time 
be known. At present the Ear Eastern question is has- 
tening to a definite discussion. The opposing nations 
are becoming more and more clearly known. It is now 
generally assumed in this part of the world that the 
United States is irrevocably involved in- the portentous 
issues of the struggle that the great powers will at length 
not be able to avoid. 

We have been brought, as a nation, to the coast of 
Asia. Over this fact I have heard some Europeans in 
Japan express undisguised pleasure. "You are in for 
it now and can't get away," was the form in which this 
satisfaction was expressed to me not long ago. Yes ! we 
are " in for it ;'" but where are we " in for it " to uphold 
before the world now the standard of popular liberty, of 
a government of the people, for the people, and by the 
people ; of a government basing its dominion upon the 
consent of the people it governs ; of a government striving 
to realize the ideals that induced our forefathers to yield, 
with sacred devotion, property, person, and life ? Where 
for these great purposes we are " in for it " at Manila it is 
just now difficult to see. As far as present evidence dis- 
closes facts, one is sorely tempted to lament of our 
republic, " How are the mighty fallen ! " 

To friends and to fellow-citizens I declare that I 
sought in my " Transcript " letters to tell only the truth 
concerning the situation in the Philippines, and nothing 
but the truth. I may not have told the whole truth, but 



13 



what I have put upon record has in large measure been' 
justly a source of reproach to us, and should lead us to 
an undoing of the wrong, as far as possible ; not into 
bravado or into condemnation or persecution of those 
who have sought to hold our beloved country true to its 
original faith and past deeds. 

This plea becomes only the more forcible when, in the 
light of lately published official records, we follow the 
course of the interrelations of the Washington Adminis- 
tration and the leaders of the Filipinos. What do these 
records show but confusion and disaster resulting from 
the operation of cross-purposes held with simple persist- 
ence and devotion on each side from the very beginning ? 
These pages disclose a pathetic self-delusion — so it 
proved to be — , among the Filipinos ; a precipitate sym- 
pathy and attempts to cooperate with the Filipinos 
among the American officials than in the far East, that 
the Washington authorities at once disavowed; an un- 
swerving, uncompromising, and unconciliatory determina- 
tion on the part of the Washington Administration to 
complete its own purpose of assuming the sovereignty of 
the Philippines ; and finally the bitter disappointment , 
of the Filipinos, engendering a hostile alienation that in 
the end became — who knows just how ? — a terrible 
war. 

The following extracts f^om the records tell the 
lamentable story : " On the twenty-fourth day of April 
Aguinaldo met the United States consul and others at 
Singapore and offered to begin a new insurrection in con- 
junction with the operations of the United States navy 
at Manila. This was telegraphed to Admiral Dewey." 
Admiral Dewey at once replied : " Tell Aguinaldo to 
come as soon as possible." Aguinaldo left Singapore on 
April 26. With seventeen other " revolutionary chiefs," 
early in May he was taken on the United States steamer 
" McCulloch " to Manila Bay. " They soon after landed 
at Cavite, and the admiral allowed them to take such 
guns, ammunitions, and stores as he did not require for 
himself." On May 24 Aguinaldo published at Cavite his 
first proclamation, beginning, " Filipinos : The great 
nation, North America, cradle of true liberty, and 
friendly on that account to the liberty of our people, 
oppressed and subjugated by the tyranny and despotism 
of those who have governed us, has come to manifest 
even here a protection which is decisive, as weM as dis- 
interested, toward us, considering us endowed with 



14 

sufficient ' civilization to govern by ourselves this our 
unhappy land." But on June 16 Secretary of State 
William L. Day, in a despatch to the consul-general at 
Singapore concerning Aguinaldo's cooperation with 
Admiral Dewey, wrote : " This Government has known 
the Philippine insurgents only as discontented and 
rebellious subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted with 
their purposes. The United States in entering upon the 
occupation of the islands, as the result of its military 
operations in that quarter, will do so in the exercise of 
the rights which the state of war confers, and will expect 
from the inhabitants, without regard to their former 
attitude toward the Spanish Government, that obedience 
which will be lawfully due from them." On July 4 
General Anderson, then commanding, wrote to Agui- 
naldo : " I desire to have the most amicable relations with 
you and to have you and your people cooperate with us 
in military operations against the Spanish forces." 

Within three weeks afterwards, July 22, General An- 
derson addressed Aguinaldo : " Commander General 
Philippine forces, I observe that your Excellency -has 
announced yourself as dictator, and proclaimed martial 
law. I have no authority to recognize this assumption." 
" In order to prevent my countrymen from making com- 
mon cause with the Spanish against the North Ameri- 
cans," answered Aguinaldo, " I came from Hong Kong." 
For this reason he had " proclaimed the dictatorship." 
This dictatorship was rapidly changing into A govern- 
ment of a "democratic and popular character/' "My 
Government has not been acknowledged by any of the 
foreign powers, but we expected that the great North 
American nation, which struggled first for its indepen- 
dence, and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is 
now actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, 
would look upon it with greater benevolence than any 
other nation." August 1, writing to Consul Williams, 
Aguinaldo said : " You say all this and yet more will re- 
sult from annexing ourselves to your people, and I also 
believe the same, since you are my friend and the friend 
of the Filipino, and have said it. But why should we 
say it ? Will my people believe it ? Is it intended, in- 
deed, to carry out annexation against the wish of these 
people, distorting the legal sense of that word ? If the 
Revolutionary Government is the genuine representative 
by right and deed of the Filipino people, as we have 
proved when necessary, why is it wished to oppress, 



15 



instead of gaining their confidence and friendship ? 
. . . The Filipino people have learned to love liberty, 
order, justice, and civil life. ... I and my leaders 
know how to admire and are ready to imitate the disin- 
terestedness, the abnegation, and the patriotism of the 
grand men of America, among whom stands preeminent 
the immortal George "Washington." 

Soon after the downfall of Manila Aguinaldo's troops 
were ordered, " by threats of violence/' he writes, " to 
retire from positions taken." General Merritt, then 
commanding, on August 20 specified an evacuation of the 
places at the time held by the " Philippine forces " with- 
in the suburbs of Manila. To this demand Aguinaldo 
yielded upon the acceptance of certain conditions by 
General Merritt. These conditions were declined by the 
American commander, and the evacuation insisted upon, 
with the explanation, " I am the more insistent in this 
particular, because recent instructions from my home 
Government contemplate this course." Aguinaldo sub- 
mitted to General Merritt's order, still pleading for the 
acceptance of his conditions, that in case the United 
States should return the islands to Spain the Americans 
would restore to him the military positions he gave up 
to them. 

"I comprehend," he wrote, August 27, "the incon- 
venience of a double occupation of the city of Manila 
and its environs, but you must also understand that 
without the wide blockade maintained by my forces you 
would have obtained possession of the ruins of the city, 
but never the surrender of the Spanish forces, who would 
haVe been able to retire to the interior towns. Do not 
make light of the aid given by us to secure the capitula- 
tion. Greatly though justice may suffer, and risking 
well-founded fears in regard to my city, I do not insist 
upon the retention of all the positions conquered by my 
forces within the environs, at the cost of much bloodshed, 
unspeakable fatigue, and much money. I promise to 
withdraw them to the following line. ... I hope 
that this time a spirit of justice will be manifest which 
is worthy of a free and admirably constituted government 
such as that of the United States of America." From 
this time forward the alienation of our army and the 
Filipinos from one another steadily grew more grave. I 
have already told its story. 

How the end will come who can predict ? My own 
earnest prayer is that the people of the United States 



16 

may, as in years past, even yet realize that there is a 
higher law than that written in the books of legislators 
and bureaus of state. We observed this law when we 
emancipated the slave. We obeyed it again when we 
started to set Cuba free. We have been long violating 
it in the Philippines. The Treaty of Paris, international 
law, the proclamations of the American President, do 
not justify us in our disobedience to its commands. Our 
Government may relentlessly proclaim that its deeds are 
only done because "it is so nominated in the bond." 
But " the quality " of justice, like that " of mercy, is not 
strained." And as a people we may well bethink our- 
selves of a time when by the decrees of the Court that 
transcends all human power we may " have justice, more 
than we desire," and go smitten and degraded among the 
nations. 



ROCKWELL AND CHURCHILl PRESS, BOSTON.